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NOTES
Bulk Sales-Transferee's Duty to Make Careful Inquiry of the Transferor's Creditors Abolished
In Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc.,' the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that under section 6-104(3)2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code a transferee in a bulk transfer, who

receives an affidavit stating that the transferor has no creditors and who
is without actual knowledge of any, can rely upon the affidavit without

having to make careful inquiry into the possible existence of any creditors. This holding abolished New York's long-standing "careful in-

quiry" requirement 3 and dispensed with the notification requirement of
section 6-105.4
'40 App. Div. 2d 146, 338 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1972).
2
The major purposes of Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code are stated in the Official
Comment to section 6-101 as follows:
1. This Article attempts to simplify and make uniform the bulk sales laws of the
states ....
2. . . . Their central purpose is to deal with two common forms of commercial
fraud, namely:
(a) The merchant . . . who sells out his stock in trade to a friend for less
than it is worth, pays his creditors less than he owes them and hopes to come
back into the business ....
(b) The merchant, . . . who sells out his stock in trade .
pockets the
proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid.
Section 6-104 places responsibilities upon the parties to a bulk transfer as follows:
(1) A bulk transfer subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of
the transferor unless:
(a) The transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list of his existing
creditors prepared as stated in this section; and
(2) The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor
or his agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all creditors of the
transferor . ...
(3) Responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list of creditors rests
on the transferor, and the transfer is not rendered ineffective by errors or omissions
therein unless the transferee is shown to have had knowledge.
3
The cases constituting authority for the careful inquiry requirement are: Klein v. Schwartz,
128 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Willner Butter & Egg Corp. v. Roth, 192 Misc. 970, 83
N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Carl Ahlers, Inc. v. Dingott, 173 Misc. 873, 18 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Marcus v. Knitzer, 168 Misc. 9, 4 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Heilmann v. Powelson,
101 Misc. 230, 167 N.Y.S. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1917). All of these cases were decided before the Uniform
Commercial Code was adopted in New York.
4
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-105 [hereinafter cited as UCC] provides in pertinent part
as follows: "In addition to the requirements of the preceding section, any bulk transfer subject to
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Plaintiff Adrian Tabin Corp. was a creditor of L.D.J. Dresses, Inc.
(the transferor) which sold its business in bulk to defendant Warman,
who then resold the same to defendant Climax Boutique, Inc. (the transferee). Prior to the consummation of the sale the transferee received an
affidavit signed by the transferor's president which stated that the transferor had no creditors.5 Creditor Adrian Tabin Corp., upon learning of
the sale, brought an action to have the sale set aside for failure to receive
notice of the transaction from the transferee as required under section
6-105. The trial court voided the sale, holding that a transferee must
make a careful inquiry into the existence of creditors of the transferor
by examining the transferor's books and questioning the transferor as
to the source of the items transferred in bulk. Since the transferee here
failed to make such an inquiry, the court held the sale was ineffective.
The appellate court reversed, holding that a transferee is under no
duty to make a careful inquiry. The court found that even though New
York had required such an inquiry under its pre-UCC bulk sales act,'
section 6-104(3), which had no counterpart under the pre-UCC law,
places the responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list
of creditors upon the transferor. A transfer is not rendered ineffective
by errors in the list unless the transferee has knowledge of them.' Since
here the transferee lacked knowledge of the plaintiff creditor, he had
complied with the requirement of notification of creditors' by obtaining
an affidavit from the transferor stating that he had none.
The dissent insisted that section 6-104(3) did not remove the careful
inquiry requirement.' The dissenter relied upon New York annotations
to section 6-104 stating that subsection three was merely declaratory of
prior New York law and citing the cases invoking the careful inquiry
requirement."0 Furthermore, the dissent argued, a transferee of an entire
this Article . . . is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless at least ten days before
he takes possession of the goods or pays for them, .... the transferee gives notice of the transfer
5The transferee had its attorney inquire of the transferor's attorney as to creditors and

searched the public records for possible liens against the transferor. The majority said these actions
constituted careful inquiry. 40 App. Div. 2d at_......., 338 N.Y.S.2d at 62. However, the trial court
had held that the transferee should have requested an examination of the transferor's books and
questioned the source of the garments involved in the sale. Id. at -,
338 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1, [1914] N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964), quoted note 17
infra.
740 App. Div. 2d at 338 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'UCC § 6-105, quoted note 4 supra.
140 App. Div. 2d at _ 338 N.Y.S.2d at 62.

1"N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-104 (McKinney 1964), N.Y. Annotation 3. The annotation states that § 6-
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business knows that the transferor probably has some creditors, and
without an inquiry, at least into the sources of the inventory, "the
opportunity for fraud upon creditors is too great.""
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE

As mentioned above, cases interpreting the pre-UCC New York
bulk sales act'2 had held that the transferee could rely upon an affidavit
of the transferor that the latter had no creditors if the transferee made
a careful inquiry and he otherwise lacked knowledge of any such creditors. 3 However, close examination discloses that the careful inquiry
requirement was adopted and subsequently affirmed on the basis of
14
mistaken use of precedent. The original New York bulk sales act
obligated the transferee to notify any creditors discoverable by the exercise of "reasonable diligence." That first statute was declared unconstitutional in Wright v. Hart.'5 In a dissenting opinion to Wright, Judge
Vann stated not only that the bulk sales act was constitutional, but also
that a transferee was thereby under a duty to make "careful inquiry"
as to the existence of creditors of the transferor.6 When the New York
legislature passed a second bulk sales act, it did not include the reasonable diligence provision of the original act, 7 only requiring the transferee
104(3) is "[n]ew to the statute, but declaratory of the New York law..." citing most of the cases
cited note 3 supra.
"140 App. Div. 2d at ____ 338 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
"Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1, [1914] N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964).
"Cases cited note 3 supra.
"The text of that law provided in relevant part as follows:
Section 1. A sale of any portion of a stock of merchandise other than in the ordinary
course of trade . . . of the seller's business . . . shall be fraudulent and void as against
the creditors of the seller, unless . . . the seller and the purchaser shall . . . make full,
explicit inquiry of the seller as to name and place of residence. . . of each and every
creditor of the seller. . . and. . . in good faith notify. . . each of the seller's creditor's
of whom the purchaser has knowledge, or can with the exercise of reasonable diligence
acquire knowledge, of such proposed sale. ...
Law of April I1,1902, ch. 528, § 1, [1902] N.Y. Laws 1249 (emphasis added).
"5182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905).
"Id.at 356, 75 N.E. at 414.
"The text of that law provided in relevant part as follows:
§ 44. Transfer of goods in bulk. 1.The sale, transfer or assignment in bulk of any
part or the whole of a stock of merchandise,. . . otherwise than in the ordinary course
of trade. . . shall be void as against the creditors of the seller. . . unless the purchaser
* . *demand and receive from the seller . . . a written list of the names and addresses
of the creditors of the seller . . . certified . . . under oath to be a full, accurate and
complete list of his creditors . . . and . . . notify . . . every creditor whose name and
address are stated in said list, or of which he has knowledge . . ..
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to notify the creditors listed or known to him. The new act was held
8
constitutional in Klein v. Maravelas.1
Speaking for the majority in
Klein, Judge Cardozo stated that the court was adopting the "argument
and the conclusion"' 9 of Judge Vann's dissent in Wright, but Cardozo
neither recited the careful inquiry requirement nor specifically said that
the court was adopting that part of the dissent. When stated by Judge
Vann, the careful inquiry requirement had a statutory basis, the reasonable diligence requirement, but it had no such basis under the newer law.
Judge Cardozo seemingly only intended to state his concurrence with
the Wright dissenter's argument and conclusion that the provisions of
a bulk sales act did not deny equal protection. Yet all the subsequent
cases20 speaking on the issue have either directly or indirectly relied upon
the Wright dissent and Klein as precedent for the careful inquiry requirement without examining the statutory basis or the merits of the
requirement. The court in Adrian Tabin did not base its holding on this
chain of misunderstanding, but held simply that section 6-104(3) of the
UCC made careful inquiry unnecessary.
TREATMENT OF THE ADRIAN TABIN ISSUE BY OTHER STATES

Nearly all of the states had enacted bulk sales acts prior to their
adoption of Article 6.21 Although they varied in detail, the statutes in
approximately two-thirds of the states were modeled after the New
23
York statute; 22 the remainder followed the Pennsylvania statute,
which included a provision making the transferee responsible for the
application of the purchase money pro rata among the creditors.24 The
overwhelming majority of cases held that where the transferor omitted25
one or more creditors from the list, a transferee acting in good faith
could rely upon the list and was not responsible for notifying the omitted
creditors.2 The commentators agreed.2 1 Where a transferee received a
Law of April 23, 1914, ch. 507, § 1,[19141 N.Y. Laws 2017 (repealed 1964).
18219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916).
"Id. at 387, 114 N.E. at 811.
21Cases cited note 3 supra.
213 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 643, at 467 (rev. ed. 1948).
221d.; see text of the New York bulk sales act quoted note 17 supra.
13No. 141, [1919] Pa. Laws 262 (repealed 1953).
243 S. WILLISTON, supra note 21, § 643, at 468.
21In UCC § 1-201(19), "good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."
2"See, e.g., McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S.W. 827 (1920);
Bione v. Bell, 221 I11.
App. 434 (1920); Highway Sign & Servicing Co. v. Scott, 134 Kan. 658, 8
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transferor's affidavit that he had no creditors, some courts held that

such an affidavit would not suffice as a "list of creditors.

28

But the

courts that did accept the row-creditor affidavit as a list of creditors held
that the transferee unaware of creditors could rely upon the affidavit's
29
correctness and notify no one.

After the adoption of Article 6, several commentators have con-

curred that if the transferee receives a no-creditor affidavit and is unaware of creditors, he can rely upon the sworn statement of the transferor

that there are no creditors to notify. 3 As for judicial resolution of the
issue, there is only one other reported case, in addition to Adrian Tabin.
In Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Howells," the court held that where

the transferee in a bulk sale of a tavern business received in affidavit
form a list of creditors on which the word "none" appeared in the space
for names, the only issue was whether the transferee otherwise knew that
the plaintiff was a creditor. The court concluded that the UCC did not
even apply to the contested transfer. 32 Nevertheless, the court stated
that assuming the provisions of Article 6 did apply, the defendant trans-

ferees did not have sufficient notice that plaintiff was a creditor of the
transferor for the transaction to be set aside for failure to give notifica-

tion.3"

P.2d 391 (1932); McLaney v. Fortune Operating Co., 84 Nev. 491, 444 P.2d 505 (1968); Fitzhugh
v. Munnell, 92 Ore. 47, 179 P. 679 (1919); Axler v. Moran, 40 Del. County Ct. 401 (C.P. Del.
County Pa. 1953); Glantz v. Gardiner, 40 R.I. 297, 100 A. 913 (1917); Fischer v. Rio Tire Co., 65
S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Com. App. 1933);. Spokane Merchants Ass'n v. Koska, 118 Wash. 445, 203 P.
969 (1922).
2See, e.g., Brown, The Uniform Commercial Code Bulk Sales Article Compared With West
Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 385, 390 (1962); Hansell, Bulk Transfers Under Article 6 of
The Iowa Uniform Commercial Code, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 275, 284 (1970); Note, Bulk Sales and
Article 6, 20 WASH. & LE L. REV. 278, 284 (1963).
2
See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
"See, e.g., Mollen, Thompson & James Co. v. Klein, 27 Ohio Dec. 155, 19 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
415 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1917).
"Hansell, supra note 27, at 284; see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-3, at 651 [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS];
Shkolnick, The Nebraska Uniform CommercialCode: Article 6-Bulk Transfers,43 NEB. L. REV.
760, 766 (1964).
3'l02 N.J. Super. 243, 245 A.2d 765 (Ch. 1968), affd, 105 N.J. Super. 511, 253 A.2d 480
(App. Div. 1969).
"Id. at 250, 245 A.2d at 769.
"Id. at 247, 245 A.2d at 768. The court cited "N.J.S. 12A: 6-104(3),'" the New Jersey
codification of UCC § 6-104(3). Id. Therefore since the defendant transferees did not have sufficient notice of plaintiff creditor, they were not responsible for the inaccuracy of the transferor's
no-creditor affidavit.
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THE Two BASIC ISSUES UNDER SECTION 6-104

What kind of "knowledge" must the transferee have under section
6-104(3)? Section 1-201(25)" 4 defines "knowledge" as "actual knowledge" rather than mere "notice" that exists when one has reason to
know a fact from all surrounding circumstances. Thus, as White and
Summers have concluded, even if most of the inventory had been purchased by the transferor from a single supplier, the transferee has no
duty to inquire whether that supplier has been paid if his name was
omitted from the list of creditors or if the transferee received a nocreditor affidavit,35 unless the transferee actually knows that the supplier is a creditor of the transferor. 0 The implication has been made"
that because the definitional cross references following section 6-104 do
not refer to section 1-201(25), yet do refer to other definitions under
section 1-201,' s the Code definition of "knowledge" as "actual knowledge" might not apply. But this exclusion is only of nominal significance; UCC experts argue that such references are not meant to be
39

exhaustive.

Therefore those cases holding under pre-UCC bulk sales acts that
the transferee must notify all creditors of whom he should have reason
to know as well as creditors actually known and creditors listed4" seem
to be in direct conflict with section 1-201(25) by allowing "notice" to
suffice as "knowledge."
It has also been argued that section 6-104(3) might not apply to a
transfer in which a no-creditor affidavit instead of a list of creditors is
34UCC § 1-201(25) provides:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it;
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question
he has reason to know that it exists.
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual knowledge of
it . . .
3WHITE

& SUMMERS §

19-3, at 650.

"8As Professor Hawkland states, the very reason for section 6-104(3) is that the transferee
cannot normally know if the list of creditors is accurate. W. HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES
168 (2d ed. 1958).
-N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-101 (McKinney 1964), Practice Commentary, pt. IV, § B.
"Other definitional cross references to section 1-201 are: "Creditor," "Party," "Person,"
"Signed."
11R. SPIEDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL TRANSAcTIONS 51 (1969).
"OSee Highway Sign & Servicing Co. v. Scott, 134 Kan. 658, 8 P.2d 391 (1932); Fitzhugh v.
Munnell, 92 Ore. 47, 179 P. 679 (1919).
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furnished,4 because a no-creditor affidavit is not a list of creditors. In
fact, several pre-UCC cases apparently accepted this argument and
carefully scrutinized the language of no-creditor affidavits to determine
whether the affidavit covered all the creditors contemplated under the
bulk sales acts. In Interstate Shirt & Collar Co. v. Windham," the
transferor's affidavit stated that the inventory was entirely free from
debt, yet the court held that the affidavit was limited to certain creditors
and thus not in compliance with the statute. Also in Romeo & Co. v.
Nassif " it was held that the transferor's affidavit that he had no creditors connected with his trade was not broad enough to comprise a full
list of his creditors. Even though the above cases seem correct where a
limiting no-creditor affidavit is involved, it also appears logical to assert
that a truthful affidavit by a transferor that he absolutely has no creditors is in fact a list of creditors, and even a false no-creditor affidavit is
merely a list of his creditors with all creditors' names omitted.
CONCLUSION

The UCC 4 and the New York cases" state that the Code should
be liberally construed to promote its underlying purpose and policies.
However, the language of section 6-104(3) is simple and unambiguous.
Even though Adrian Tabin gives a reasonable construction to section
6-104(3), the decision causes a drastic and undesirable change in New
York bulk sales law and uncovers a significant loophole for those transferors who wish to defraud their creditors. Furthermore, it seems likely
that no reasonable court could construe section 6-104(3) differently
from the Adrian Tabin court. Thus through section 6-104(3), the main
purpose of Article 6 can be frustrated."
Section 6-104 should be amended to place a greater burden upon
the transferee. This might be accomplished in one of two ways: first, by
requiring the transferee to take a more active part in ascertaining the
transferor's creditors, such as by requiring him to examine the transferor's books or to make inquiry of the transferor as to the vendor of
the inventory; or secondly, by lowering the standard of awareness of
41N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-101 (McKinney 1964), Practice Commentary, pt. IV, § B.
42165 Mich. 648, 131 N.W. 102 (1911).
137 Ohio App. 382 (1917).
4
4UCC § 1-102(1).
"See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
4
UCC § 6-101, Comment 2, quoted note 2 supra.
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those creditors from "knowledge" to "notice." 47 The first proposal differs only slightly from the careful inquiry actions suggested by the trial
court and the dissent in Adrian Tabin. The second proposal has the
merits of being simple and easy to effectuate. Either would greatly

reduce the possibility of bulk transfers in defraud of creditors. In the
last analysis, Adrian Tabin is truly a fulfillment of the prophecy of
White and Summers that section 6-104(3) "may prove to be unwise."48
HENRY ALEXANDER EASLEY, III

Constitutional Law-The Indigent and Access to the Civil Courts
Recent decisions in state and federal courts have attempted to

define the scope of an indigent's right to obtain free access to civil
courts.' The United States Supreme Court responded to the confusion
created by several of these decisions with United States v. Kras,2 which

presented a constitutional challenge to the filing fee requirement for the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. The Court refused to extend its
holding in Boddie v. Connecticut3 to bankruptcy actions and rejected
the indigent petitioner's constitutional attack on mandatory filing fees. 4

This decision not only upholds the constitutionality of filing fees in
bankruptcy proceedings but also provides some guidelines for determining the constitutionality of similar fees in other areas of civil litigation.
Robert W. Kras submitted his petition in bankruptcy to the United
4

See UCC § 1-201(25).
& SUMMERS § 19-3, at 650. Before one assumes from the Adrian Tabin decision that
such a transferor consequently escapes the criminal laws and the grasp of his creditors,
two points are of noteworthy significance. First, UCC § 6-104, Comment 3, states that "the
sanction for the accuracy of the list of creditors is the criminal law of the state relative to failse
... Second, other creditors' remedies such as attachment and execution pursuant to
swearing.
judgment on other assets of the transferor are available. Furthermore, no provision in Article 6
precludes an attack on a bulk transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.
"WHITE

'In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); Almarez v. Carpenter, 347 F. Supp. 597 (D.
Colo. 1972); In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Wis. 1972); O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Robinson v.
Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and
Welfare, 303 A. 2d 794 (Maine 1973).
2409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held filing fees in divorce actions unconstitutional as applied
to indigents.
1409 U.S. at 443-50.

